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Statute of Frauds-Promise to Pay the Debt
of Another.
It is provided in the statutes of Pennsylvania, by
the Act of May 26, 1855, Sec. 1, P. L. 308,1 that "No action shall be brought whereby to charge * * * * * the
defendant, upon any special promise, to answer for the
debt or default of another, unless the agreement upon
which action shall be brought, or some memorandum
or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith or some other -person by
him authorized," and that the act shall not apply to
affect any contract made or responsibility incurred for
,any contract the consideration of which shall be a less
sum than twenty dollars. .This is, in substance, practically the same as the original English statute of
frauds" and is typical of the statutes in the other states
of the union. The application of the statute has been,
Lnd is, difficult, for the courts have not always put upon the language of the statute a strict and literal interpretation, whioh would only require a distinction between promises to answer for the debts of others, and
promises which come into some relationship with ddbts
of others, but are not promises to answer for such debts.
12 Purdon's Digeat, 1759.
229 Car. 2, c. 3, Sec. 4.

224

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Since the application of the statute has been difficult
and many cases thave been decided as without the statute upon facts apparently within the letter of the statute, there have arisen -many so-called exceptions
to the requirement of the statute, it becomes interesting, as well as helpful, to exan-ne the authonities
on the vexed question as to when the statute is or is not
applicable.
Original and Collateral Promises.
Before entering upon -any discussion of the question, it must be noted that the authorities very generally apply the term "original" to those promises to pay
the debts of other which are not within the statute, and,
therefore, not required to be in writing, and the term
"collateral" to such promises as are within the statute.3
It will, therefore, be convenient and conducive to brevity to employ these terms.
L Pronises Made by the Defendant to the Debtor.
If A owes B $100, and C, for a valuable consideration, promises A that he will pay A's debt to B, it is
universally recognized that C's promise is "original,"
i.e., is not within the statute and need not be in writing.4 When the statute speaks of a promise to answer
fbr the debt of "another," it does not mean of a person
other than the pronisor, but it mfeans of a person other
than the contracting parties. Such a promise made to
the debtor is a promise made to "the other," and not to
Townsend vs. Long, 77 Pa. 143, 146; Nugent vs. Wolfe, 111
Pa. 471, 480; Stouffer vs. Jackson, 42 Pa. Sup. Ct. 450.
'Oliphant vs. Patterson, 56 Pa. 368. But see Shoemaker vs.
King, 40 Pa. 107, where inan action by the creditor on such a
promise, it being apparently considered that he might sue as
beneficiary, it was held that such a promise must be in writing.
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"another." 5 This principle, first decided in an English
case is certainly applicable where A, the debtor-promisee, brings an action upon such a promise against C,
the promisor.7 But when B sues C wpon such a promise,
it being apparently considered that he may sue as beneficiary in A's name, it has been held that such a promise must be in writing. It has been stated that in an
action by the creditor against the promisor it has not
been settled in Pennsylvania that the mere fact that
the promise was made to the debtor is, of itself, decisive. 9 But where C orally promises A that he will pay A's
debt to B, and there is a transfer o& a fund by A to C
for the payment of the debt, C has been held liable to
B, the creditor, ujon his oral prchn4se to A10; or, if
property charged with the payment of the debt be
transferred to C on his oral promise to the vendor, A,
to pay the debt, C is liable to B, the creditor, although
his promise is not in writing,1 ' or if property is transferred by A to C, and as part payment, C promises A
that he will pay a debt which A owes B, C is liable to
2
B on his oral promise to A.'1
Although it may be stated that generally a
promise to the debtor to pay the latter's debt is
not within the statute
and need not be in
writing, -it is sometimes difficult to determine whether
5Eastwood vs. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 445.
eSupra, note 5.
70iphant vs. Patterson, note 4.
kShoemaker vs. King, supra, note 4.

Fehlinger vs. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, 524.
1Justice vs. Tallman, 86 Pa. 147; Wynn vs. Wood, 97 Pa. 216;
Stoudt vs. Hine, 45 Pa. 30; Howes vs. XMezCrea, 21 Pa. Super. t.
592.
"Pehlinger vs. Wood, supra, note 9; Howes vs. McCrea, 21

Pa. Super. Ct. 592, 595; Townsend vs. Long, 77 Pa. 143; Taylor
vs. Preston, 79. Pa. 436.
'2Delp vs. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42; Clymer vs. De Young, 54
Pa. 118.

226

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the -promisee is a debtor or a creditor. Suppose C says
to A, "If you will go as surety on B's bail bond to the
state of D," or "If you will go as surety upon B's note
to D, and if you have to pay, I will reimburse you."
Here A, the promisee, appears both in the role of possible debtor to D, and of possible creditor to B. Is the
promise made to A, as debtor or as creditor? It has
been decided that the promise is made to A as creditor;
that the prodmise is, therefore, a promise to pay the debt
of another and required to be in writing under the
statute,s although there is weighty authority to the
contrary."'
I. Promise Made by the Defendant to the Creditor.
(A) At the time the credit is given or debt created.
Before the passage of the English Statute of
Frauds, it had been decided that if property or goods
were delivered to A by B, solely upon C's promise to
pay, C would be liable in an action of debt, and later of
ludebitatus assumpsit, 5 but if property or goods were
delivered to A by B so that A became obligated to pay,
although C at the same time promised to see that B
was paid, debt or indebitatus assumpsit would lie
against A only, and that C could only be sued in special
assumpsit on his promise. 8 Thus, after the passage of
the statute, if A was the only one liable in debt in such
a transaction, C's promise was a "special promise to
answer for the debt of another" and must be in writ13

Nugent vs .Wolfe, 111
45 Pa. 350.
2'Guild & Co. vs Conrad
42 N. J. Law 138; Tighe vs.
Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446.
'5Stonehouse vs. Bodvil,
Tompkins, 2 Ld. Raym. 982
IGAlford vs. Egliskeld, 2
Coggin, -Styles 6 (1647).

Pa. 471;

see also Miller vs. Long,

(1894) 2 Q. B. 885; Wills vs. Shinn,
Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263; Jones vs.
T. Raym. 67 (1663); Jordan vs.
(1703).
Dyer 230 b, pl, 56 (1564); Ward vs.
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ing." but if C, the promisor, was liable in debt, his
prorrse was to answer for his own debt and so not
within the statute.,'
Modern authorities have followefd the results of
there early cases though, perhaps, not upon the abovementioned theory of pleading. So if C says to B, "Let A
have these goods, and I will pay for them," credit is
given solely to C and A never becomes bound to pay for
the goods at all, and thus C's prorrise is original and
.need not be in writing." C is promising to pay his own
debt. But if the transaction has the effect of C saying
to B, 'Let A have these goods and I will -pay for them,
if he does not," then A becomes primarily bound to pay
for the goods he has received and C's promise is collateral and, therefore, must be in writing.2O
Soxnetimes C's promise does not so clearly show
whether credit was extended to him alone or primrily
to A, the debtor. Thus if C says to B, "Let A have these
goods, and I will see you paid," is credit extended to C
alone and is his promise original, or, is credit extended
primarily to A and C's promise collateral? Whether C's
17Watkins vs. Perkins, 1 UA. Raym. 224 (1702).
18-atkins vs. Perkins, supra, note 17.
'aBlack vs. Bernheimer, 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 41; Potter vs.
Greenberg, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 505; May vs. Walker, 20 Pa. Super.
Ct. 581; Kaufman vs. Abeles, 11 Pa. Super. t. 616; Speers vs.
Knarr, 4 Pa. Super Ct. 80; Watson vs. Porzel, 158 Pa. 513; Booth
vs. Heist, 94 Pa 17-7; Paon vs. .Hassinger, 69 Pa. 311; Jefferson vs. Slagle, 66 Pa. 202; smith vs. McKenna, 53 Pa. 151, in
all of which B furnished goods to, performed services or labor
for, or advanced money to A, extending credit solely to C, the
promisor. See also Nugent vs. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 481, and

Greenough vs. Eichholtz, 16 At. (Pa.) 712.
2oPutman Machine Co. vs. Cann and Saul, 173 Pa. 392;
Dougherty and Company vs. Bash, 167 Pa. 429; Nazareth F. and
M. Co. vs. Beck, 66 Pa. Super Ct. 238; Ranc ilvs. Krohne, 31 Pa.
Super. Ct. 130.
2lBoston vs. Farr, 14 8 Pa. 220.
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promise is original or collateral depends on the facts and
surrounding circumstances of each particular case, and
so it has been held that C's promise in the form "I will
see you -paid" was original and thus need not be in writing,2 1 and, on the other hand, that a promise in similar
form was collateral to an obligation co-tempornaeously
created against A, the debtor, and so must be in writ22
ing.
Same-Joint Promisors.
If C and A undertake as joint debtors or jointly
and severally for money borrowed, goods delivered or
services rendered by B, C's promise need not be in writing, though the goods or mpney are delivered to, or the
services performed for, only A. Although as between
C and A, C may be a surety or guarantor, as against
B, C is an original debtor as much as is A, and, therefore, C's promise is to pay his own obligation and
23
need not be in writing,
Same-Guaranty of Del Credere Agent.
An agent who promaises -his principal to be responsible for the price of goods sold by him in consideration
of his employment and comanissions is called a del
credere agent.2 4 His prordse seen~s to be one to answer
20Lewis Va. Lewis Lumber Co., 156 Pa. 217; Miller vs. Long,

45 Pa. 350; Shannon vs. American Manufacturing Company, 86
Pa. Super. Ct.

11; Rancil vs. Krohne, 31 Pa. Super.

Ct.

130;

Gable vs. Graybill, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 29. See on the whole question of contemporary promises to pay for goods furnished to,
money loaned to, or services Tendered for another, collection of
cases22in 15 L. R. A. (n. s.) 214.
See Oldenburg vs. Dorsey, 102 Md. 172, and cases collected in note thereto in 5 Amer. and Eng. Ann. Cas. 833; cases
cited in 20 Cyc. 184. The point seems never to have been raised
'in Pennsylvania.

24Spencer on Suretyship, p. 101, sec. 76.
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for the debt of those persons to whom Fhe sells goods,
but it is universally held that the promise of a del
credere agent, in such cases, is not within the statute
and need not be in writing. 25 Several grounds have been
assigned for excepting a del credere agent's .promise
from the operation of the statute. The early cases were
decided on the theory that the del credere agent is the
original debtor, and that to his obligation is later added that of the principal.2 This reasoning is deemed er-

roneous by a text-writer, who clalmis that the del
credere agent is a surety for the purchaser, who becomes the debtor. "The true engagement of the factor,
in such cases, is merely to pay the debt, if it is not
punctually discharged by the buyer.' ' 27 Again, it is argued that the promise of a del credere agent is not a
special -promise as that term is used, and was understood when the original statute was adopted, and, therefore, is simply an exception to the requirement of the
statute.28 Bfut the most acceptable ground upon which
such a promise is held not to be within the statute is
that, thofigh a del credere agent promises to answer
for the debt of another, his principal purpose is to establish the relationship of principal and agent, to obtain employment with its advantages and benefits, and
that his promise to answer for the debts of his customers is purely incidental.

29

25Couturier vs. Hastie, (1852) 8 Exch. 40; Swan vs. Nesmith,
7 Pick. (Mass.) 220; and cases in 20 Cyc. 1S6.
26

Swan vs. Nesmith, supra, note 25.

2TStory, Agency (5th Ed) Sec. 15.

2aSee 57 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. and Amer. Law Reg. 611,
29.Couturier vs. Hastie, supra, note 25.
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(B) After the Original Credit is Given or Debt Created.
Promise to pay out of funds or property of debtor.
If A owes B a sum of money, and C promises B
that he (C) will pay A's antecedent debt, it certainly
seems that such a promise falls within the prohibition
of the statute, and must be in writing. While, perhaps,
it may be said to be the general rule bh'at a promise to
-pay the antecedent debt of another, which continues to
exist, must 'be in writing under the statute, yet the
courts have held that some promises to pay the antecedent debt of -another,'although within the apparent
letter of the statute, are not within its spirit, and so
may be said to be original promises and not required to
be in writing.
Thus where A turns aver to C property or funds
out of which C promises to pay A's antecedent debt to
B, and C later promises B, for a valuable consideration,
that he will apply such property or funds to the paynient of A's debt, C's promise to B is literally a promise
to ,answer for A's debt. But it is generally held that if
one has funds or property belonging to the debtor which
'he is under a duty,30 or is authorized to apply 31 to the
discharge of the debtor's debt, his promise to pay such
debt is not within the statute though it be made to the
creditor.
The mere fact that the promisor has funds or
property of the debtor in his possession, however, will
not withdraw his promise from the statute.3 2 The ifunds
30

Hall vs. Lincoln Savings and Trust Company, 220 Pa. 485.
1'Smith vs. Exchange Bank, 110 Pa. 508, 519; Wynn vs.
Wood, 97 Pa. 216; Dock vs. Boyd & Co., 93 Pa. 92; Howes vs.
McCrea, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 592, and see Howarth vs. McClure,
3

349 Pa. 170.
3 Shaaber vs Bushong, 105 Pa. .514, where a promise to pay
a note out of money belonging to the maker, which might be in
the hands of the promisor at the maturity of the note, was re-

quired to be in writing.
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or property must have been placed in his possession by
the debtor for the purpose of paying the latter's debt
and must be in the possession of- the promisor at the
time of the promise in order to except the promise to
the creditor from the statute.3 3 The reasoning applied
in such a case is that the promisor, in making his promise to the creditor, is primarily seeking to fulfill his obligation to the debtor or 'is simly pronmAsing to perform
his own duty as agent or trustee, and that any prenmise
to answer for the debtor's debt is incidental and secondary.
A somewhat similar situation arises where C is indebted to A and A procures goods on credit from B upon C's prondise to B to pay him what he owes A, to ,be
applied to the discharge of A's debt. C's promise would
seem, to be merely a promise to pay his own pre-existing debt to A to the person designated by A, and not a
promise to answer for A's debt to B. But, in reality,
C's promise is to pay A's debt, and the method of payment will simply involve the liquidation of his own debt
to A. C's promise falls within the prohibtion of the
statute and must be in writing.-'
Same--Promise as Payment for, or in Relief of4
erty Bought From Debtor.

Prop-

Where A owes B, and C buys property from A,
and promises A to pay his debt to B as payment, in
part or in whole, of the purchase price of the property,
it has already been noted that B may sue C on such a
promise and that the promise need not be in writing3 5
- Shaaber vs. Bushong, supra, note 32.
34Connor vs. Stewart, 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, where a contractor promised to pay for materials to be furnished a xnlcontractor out of moneys which the promisor owed the sub-contractor; see Stouffer vs. Jackson, 42 Pa. Super Ct. 4.50, semble.
ssSupra, note 12.
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But suppose C then promises B, for a valuable consideration, such as forbearance to sue A, that he (C) will
pay A's debt. This is,-literally, a promise to pay A's
debt and so, at least within the letter of the statute,
but not within the spirit, for, the courts say, C's promise is, primarily, to fulfill his own obligation, since, as
between himself and A, he has assumed A's debt, and
any -promise to pay A's debt is merely incidental and
secondary.38
Similarly, Where A owes B and the debt is a lien
on A's property, and C buys the property from A, C's
promise to B to pay A's debt, in consideration of the
relinquishment of the lien, is not within the statute,
for Cs promise is, primarily, in relief of his own prop37
erty and only secondarily to pay A's debt.
Same-New Consideration Moving to and Beneficial to
the Promisor.
It must be remembered that in the foregoing discussion of a third person's promise to pay the antecedent debt of the debtor, the debtor's liability has continued to exist, and it has been attempted to show that,
in spite of the continued liability of the debtor, the
promise of the third person mnAy still be original and so
not within the prohibition of the statute. So far, it has
been noted that a promise to pay the antecedent debt
of another is original, if the promise is to pay out of
funds or property of the debtor or if the promise is in
part payment of, or in relief of, the promisor's property.
It was said in an early New York case, Leonard vs.
Vredenburgh, 38 that, although the promise to pay the.
3 . Kenyon Co. vs. Sutton, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 445, and cases
in note 12, supra.
37
Landis vs. Royer, 59 Pa. 95; Rees vs. Jutte, 153 Pa. 56;
and cases in note 11, supra; Arnold vs. Stedman, 45 Pa. 186.
388 Johns (N. Y.) 29.
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antecedent and subsisting debt of another might not
fall in either of the above-mentioned classes, still such
a promise is original and need not be in writing, "when
the promise to pay the debt of another arises out of
some new and original consideration of benefit or harm
moving between the newly contracting parties," i. e.,
the promisor and the creditor-prorisee. Taken by themselves, these words simply ,mean that if there is any
consideration for the promise, other than the consideration which supports the debtor's debt, the promise is
original. Though this is not the result intended to be
reached by the court, as shown in subsequent cases,39
Leonard vs. Vrdenburgh has been cited for the broad
proposition above-stated and has caused much confusion.40 But, as pointed out in MNaule vs Bucknell, 41 the
proposition laid down in Leonard vs. Vredenbur-gh, as
construed in subsequent cases, was inaccurate as "it
practically denies all effect to the statute," for the
-promise, to be binding at all, must be supported by consideration and the necessity of a writing is an entirely
separate question. To say, therefore, that a promise to
pay the debt of another need not be in writing if it is
founded on a new consideration is a practical nullification of the statute.
. The court in Maule vs. Bucknell, supra, said, however, that the nature of the consideration supporting
39Mallory vs. Gillett, 1 N. Y. 412, which said that the language in Leonard vs. Vredenburgh simply meant that the promise was original if founded on a new consideration, othar than that
supporting the debtor's debt which moved to the promisor,
whether it be harm to the promisee or benefit to the promisor,
which simply means "a new. considera'ion moving to and beneficial to the promisor." See 20 Col. L. Rev. 153, f64.

40Malone vs. Keener, 44 Pa. 107; Arnold vs. Stedman, 45 Pa.
186. In both cases Leonard vs. Vrdenburgh was cited for the
proposition that the promise of a third person to pay the debt
of another was original, if founded on a new consideration.
450 Pa. 39.
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the promise to pay another's antecedent debt may be of
imiportance in determining whether such a promise is
within the statute. Thus,, in substance, was evolved the
principle that a promise to pay the debt of another is
i-ot within the statute Where it is made to obtain in exchange a benefit for the promisor, or as the principle,
with like effect, is stated in Nugent vs. Wolfe, 42 the
promise to pay the antecedent debt of another who also continues liable is not within the statute, "When the
leading object of the promisor is to subserve some interest or purpose of -his own, notwithstanding the effect
is to pay or discharge the debt df another."
Eun~loying thIs principle, many promises to pay
the antecedent debt of another have been enforced, although they were not in writing, where the facts did
not disclose a promise to -pay out of funds or property
of the debtor nor a promise in payment of, or in relief
of, the promisor's property, but the object of the promisor was to subserve some interest or purpose of his
own. 43 For examiple, promises to .pay the debt of another in consideration of the creditor forbearing to sue
the dtbtor's estate in which the promisor was directly
interested;" in consideration of creditor continuing
work for debtor and thus relieve promisor from liability
as surety to debtor;45 in consideration of creditor, a
superior lienor, fomibearing to bid at execution sale
and to thus allow promisor to bid without competi
tion; ' 6 in consideration of creditor buying ]and owned
4111 Pa. 471, 480; see also Bailey vs. Marsball, 174 Pa. 602.
'&Klein vs. Rand, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 263; Duncan vs. Shaw,
17 Pa. Super Ct. 22 ; Baxter vs. Hurlbur., 1.5 Pa. Super. Ct. 541;
Weber & Co. vs. Bishop, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 51; Roland vs. Eckman, 12 Pa. Super Ct. 75; Kelly vs. Baun, 6 Pa. Super Ct. 327;
and cases cited infra, notes 44-0, inclusive.
9Kirby vs. Kirby, 248 Pa, 1"17.

'5Pizzi vs. Nardello, L09 Pa. 1.
' 6 3Baley vs. Marshall, 174 Pa. 602.
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in crmnion by promisor and debtor, the debt being a
lien on the land ;47 in consideration of creditor completing buildings upon which promisor held mortgages;"1
in consideration of creditor refraining from filing a
mechanic's lien against property of the promisor;'9 in
consideration of creditor forbearing to sue debtor corporation of which the prormisor was president and also
a creditor ;30 have been 'held to be wvithout the statute,
because the leading object of the promisor is to subserve some interest or purpose of his own.
On the other hand, promises to pay the antecedent
debt of another, where the creditor held a judgminent
which was inferior to that held by the promisor,1 or in
consideration of creditor refraining from evicting debtor, creditor's tenant, for non-payment of rent-,2 or, in
consideration of creditors of a corporation resigning as
directors 'and electing promisors in their places, 3 have
been dield to fall within the statute, because the leading object of the promisor was to pay the debt of another who continued liable and was not to subserve any
interest or purpose of his own."
47.Elkin vs. Timlin, 151 Pa. 491.
"48errman vs .McManus, 102 Pa. 102.
'OSilberstein vs. Bernstein, 58 Super. Ct. 375;
Mazer, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 436.

Burr

vs.

50Goodling vs. Simon, 54 Pa. Super. Ct. 125.

5Branson vs. Kitchenman, 148 Pa. 541.
52Riegelman vs. Focht, 141 Pa. 380.
53
Maule vs. Bucknell, 50 Pa. 39, although this decision seems
erroneous in view of later decisions. The leading object of the

promisors was to subserve some interest of their own. Cf. Goodling vs. Simon, supra, note 50.
5
'Riley vs. Kahan, 68 Super. Ct. 415, where an owner in a

building contract deposited a sum of money with a utakeholder
who was to pay the contractor. A materialman asked the owner

if he would be responsible for materials furnished
tractor; the owner said if the materialman should
from the contractor on the stakeholder, that he, the
vee that the materialman would get his money.
promise was held to be within the statute.

to the conget an order

owner, would
The owner's
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It is interesting to examine, in this connection, the
doctrine of the English courts, that a promise to pay
the anteceddent debt of another is not within the statute
if the object of the contract between the promisor and
the creditor is the accrual of some benefit or advantage
to the promisor,5 5 although there is incidentally a prom,
ise to pay the debt of another. In Pennsylvania, as already noted, the promise is original if the leading
object of the promisor is to subserve some interest or
purpose of his own. The English doctrine places a
more narrow construction upon the statute and the
test is whether or not the obtaining of a benefit or advantage for the promisor is the subject matter of the
contract, and the test is not, as in Pennsylvania,
whether the obtaining o benefit or advantage is the
motive of the prminsor in promising to pay the debt
of another. Thus many promises, which, in Pennsylvania and the majority of American jurisdictions, fall
without the statute and require no writing, must be in
writing, under the English doctrine, which, it must be
admitted, does not tend to a general nullification of the
statute.56
Same-Promise in Sale or Transfer of Securities.
Where the holder of a note or other security assigns it for value, or in payment of his debt, or as collateral security, and promises the assignee that it will
be paid at maturity, it is fheld that his main or primary
55Harburg India Rubber Comb Company vs. Martin, (1902)
1 K. B. 776. "It is not a question of motive--it it a question of
object. You must find out what the partes were in fact dealing
about. What was the subject matter of the contract?"
56The cases cited in notes 30, 31,' 35, 36, 37, supra, would
require no writing even under the English doctrine. For- a valuable discussion of the peculiar and confused doctrine of the
New York courts in this connection, see article by Prof. C. K.
Burdick in 20 Columbia Law Review, 153.
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purpose is not to answer for the debt of the obligor or
maker of such security, though he does so incidentally, but to induce the assignee to take the security, and
the statute does not apply57
IlI. Promises Made Upon the Extinction of the Original
Debt.
A. In consideration of the release of the original debtor.
An oral promise to pay the preexisting debt of another in consideration that the original debtor shall be
discharged from liability thereon is not within the statute. In such a case, it being agreed that the debt of the
original debtor shall be extinguished, there remains no
-obligation to which the undertaking of the obligor can
be collateral, and the pron-4ise being founded on a sufficient consideration, viz., detriment to the promisee in
the loss of his debt or claim against the original debtor,
the promisor becomes an original debtor to an amount
equal to the original debt.58
But, it is submitted, every promise should not be
held to fall without the statute siniply because there is
mentioned in the transaction a release of the original
debtor and an assumption of the debt by the promisor.
For example, suppose C 'says to BR"I promise to pay you
A's debt one month from date if you will promise to discharge him then," and B promises. There is a bilateral
contract, B accepting by making the requested promise
and thus making C's promise to pay obligatory. But C's
5
ITaione vs. Keener, 44 Pa. 107, where C held 'a note made
by A and negotiated it to B in payment of a debt -which C owed
B, promising to pay the note at maturity if A did not.
5$Dahlem's Estate, 15 Pa. Dist. Rep. 28; and see Shoe-

maker vs. King, 40 Pa. 107, 110; Maule vs. Bucknell, 50 Pa. 39,

52; Nugent vs. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 480. Similarly, C's promise
to pay A's debt, if B Will promise never to sue A, nead not 'be
in writing, for A is, in effect, released. 6 Harvard L. Rev. 784,
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promise is obligatory although A is not yet discharged
and A's liability will continue until C should pay B. B's
promise to discharge A is dependent cn performance by
C, viz., payment. Thus C's promise should be required
to be in writing. 59 On the other hand, if C says to B,
"If you will promise to release A one month from date,
I promise to pay -what he owes you." Here performance
of B's promise, viz., release of A, must precede performance of C's promise to pay, and when C's promise becomes obligatory, A's debt has been released and C's
promise, therefore, need not be in writing.
,Somewhat similar to the release or discharge of the
original debtor is a transaction in which B has rescinded
a partially executed contract between himself and A,
and C promises that he Will pay if B will complete the
contract, C's promise is original for A never became
liable for the cOtmpletion of the contract because of the
prior recission. C's promise is not within the statute. 0
(B) Novation.
The provision of the statute has no application to
an arrangement between A, B and C, where A owes B
and C owes A and in consideration of B releasing A and
A releasing C, C prorises to pay B. Such an arrangement, which is simply the substitution of a new debtor in place clf the original debtor whereby the obligation
of the latter is shifted to the former and thus discharged, is a novation, and the promise of the substituted debtcr (C) need not be in writing61
59

Stone vs. Justice, 9 Phila. 22; Green's Estate, 7 W. N. C.
(Pa) 66.
6
QMerriman vs. McManus, 102 Pa. 102; JEfferson County vs.
Slagle, 66 Pa. 202. But see Lewis vs. Lumber & Mfg. Co., 156
Pa. 217, where B, had not rescinded his partially executed contract with A, and C said to B, "Keep on with the work and I
will see you paid." C's promise was within the statute.
6
Jones vs. Ellis, 4 Luz. L. Reg. 275; Maule vs. Bucknell, 50
Pa. 39.
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MOOT COURT
MILTON VS. RAILROAD CO.
Trespass-Negligence-Failure to Provide Proper Spark Arresters-CircumstaAtial Evidence--Burden of Proof-Presumption
of Negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Trespass for burning plaintiff's barn. None saw the sparks
come from the locomotive and fall on the barn.
The circumstance relied on to establish the causal relation
of the defendant were: Absence of any other imaginable cause;
the fire began on the roof outside; the passing of a train five
minutes before the fire was seen (which was just beginning);
the emission by the engine of this train of many and large
sparks 15 minutes before the fire when the train was two and
a half miles from the barn; the engine was puffing hard as it
passed the barn; the wind was blowing towards the barn; the
emission of many and large sparks 15 minutes after the fire began, two and a half miles from the barn. The jury's verdict was
for the plaintiff.
Hendricks for Plaintiff.
Kunkel for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHARFSIN, J.-There are two important questions raised
in this case, the determination of which requires a careful consideration of the facts. The first of these is whether the act or
the omission to act by the defendant caused the fire, and
secondly, whether the act or omission was negligent.
The defendant contends that it must be established that an
act or omission of the defendant caused the damage, and rightly
so, and he -also maintains that proof of the distance of the barn
from the railroad tracks is essential when the attempt is made
to impose liability by circumstantial evidence. The facts do not
set forth the proximity of the tracks to the barn and the only
statements as to the relative position of the tracks and the barn
are "when the train was two and a half miles from the barn,"
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approaching, and, "two and a half miles from the barn" after it
had passed. However, a close examination of the facts will
show that the absence of the exact distanc2 between barn and
tracks is immaterial. We find that the enrine emitted many and
large sparks 15 minutes before the fire when the train was two
and a half miles from the barn and that the engine was puffing
hard as it passed the barn.
The train was two and a half miles away 15 minutes before
the fire and the train passed five minutes before the fire, so that
it traveled the two and a half miles in 1.0 minutes. Now, the
logical inference from the ftatement "the engine was puffing
hard as it passed the barn" is that the train was coming towards the barn and "passed it." How close to it we do not know;
it may have been ten, it may have been 15 feet. But it can be
seen from these words that the impossibility of this engine having caused the damage is vitiated, and since large sparks were
emitted 15 minutes before the fire and ten minutes before the
engine passed the barn, the defendant canot contend that it was
impossible to have caused the fire for the reason that the sparks
would have to travel two and a half miles. We know that the
train continued towards the barn and was "puffing hard as it
passed," and it was only necessary for the emission to continue
ten minutes in order to have the same large sparks being emitted
as it "passed the barn." The belief that emission actually occurred when it was close to the barn is strengthened by the evidence that the engine "emitted large sparks 15 minutes after
it passed the barn."
In considering the second question, to wit, the sufficiency of
the evidence that the acts or omissions of the defendant were
negligent, it must be remembered that negligence does not have
to be proved directly. In Henderson vs. P. and R. R. R. Co., 144
Pa. 4 0, it is held that "it is not required that the fact of negligence be established by positive proof, but may be proved by
circumstantial evidence," and also that "a slight presumption of
negligence raised by the plaintiff's case is sufficient to throw the
burden of disproving negligence on the defendant."
The circumstances relied on to establish the casual relation,
in our opinion, measure up to the standard required to prove that
the damage was done by the defendant's locomotive. It is likewise plain that the plaintiffs have sufficiently raised a presumption of negligence, the burden of which the defendant has failed
to disprove. In Pa. R. R. Co. vs. Watson, 81 Pa. 293, it is held
that, "the fact of an engine emitting a stream of fire and sowing
coals along its way, is evidence from which the jury may infer
an imperfect end inferior spark-arrester and from this fact,
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negligence." There could have been, no emission of "many and
large sparks" if there had been a proper spark-arrester on the
engine and defendant has offered no evidence whatsoever concerning a spark-arrester, the absence or poor condition of which
renders it prima facie guilty of negligence.
The tio othCr questions raised by the plaintiff, namely, the
admissability of the evidence offered to prove negligence, and
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff are not contested by
the defendant and will not be considered by us. Nothing has
been introduced imputing contributory negligence to the plaintiff and as for the admissability of the evidence, there is abundant authority for the admission of evidence of the kind given
in the case at bar.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The only question seems to be whether there was enough
evidence that sparks from the locomotive caused the fire.
That the defendant was negligent may be inferred, as it
was, by -the jury from the size and number of the sparks which
indicated that the locomotive was not provided with a proper
spark-arrester.
But did the negligently emitted sparks cause the fire? The
fire began on the outside of the roof of the barn. Some heatcarrier must have been applied to that roof. What was -it? A
human being who, wishing to fire the barn, got on the roof? A
preposterous hypothesis? Was it a meteor? The only things
known to set fire to the roofs of buildings except very rarely,
are sparks, and the only notable emitter of sparks in the neighborhood of a railroad, is the locomotive. The locomotive was
casting out sparks, and the wind was blowing them towards the
barn. The fire was not causeless, and the only possible cause, so
far as apears, was the sparks. Though the distance of the barn
is not precisely ascertained, it may, we think, be inferred to
have been within the reach of the only possible fire-bearers, the
sparks. The train lpassed the barn, within five minutes before the
fire was seen. We are unable to say that the court below committed error in submiting the causality of the fire to the jury.
AFFIRMED.
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COMM ONWEALTH VS. TOMPKINS.

Criminal Law-Involuntary Manslaughter-Lack of Criminal Intent--Carless Disregard of Consequences Equivalent of
Specific Intent-Motive.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
X, a boy of 12 years, was specially timid 'with respect to
water. His companions swam at a certain place in a stream but
be refused to do so. Tompkins, aged 20, intending to overcome
the reluctance of X, enticed him into a boat, and then rocked the
boat till X fell into the water. X sank, and though Tompkins and
others made earnest efforts to save him, he was drowned. Tompkins is indicted for involuntary manslaughter.
Goeltz for Plaintiff.
Kalansky for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
M. GARBER, J.-Human actions often produce results far
different from the results contempiated -and intended by the
actor. Thus an act done with a good motive, may have an evil
result, and when this is the case the unforunate doer is often
excused by the law of morals, his conscience soothes him, and
good people sympathize with him. And such person is not ordinarily liable under the criminal law, for crime proceeds only from
a criminal mind, and the question of loss to individuals does not
belong to this department of jurisprudence. The old Latin doc'trine is "Actus no facit reum, nisi mens sit rea," which freely
translated stands, "A crime is not committed if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent."
But a careless disregard of consequences is often equivalent
to a positive will to do wrong, and in many cases it supplies the
place of a direct criminal intent. This doctrine, that carelessness
sufficient in degree is equivalent to criminal intent, applies in
several crimes, but to none which require a specific intent or
motive on the part of the doer. Thus an officer to whom a person
has been entrusted for custody, who carelessly permits such
person to escape, is guilty of a7 crime. And one by mere neglect
of a duty may be guilty of committing a nuisance. And a master
is liable for the carelessness of his servants. But as in morals,
so in law, carelessness is less intensely criminal than an absolute intention to commift a crime. Thus an officer who carelessly
permits an escape, is guilty of a much less serious grime than
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one
who deliberately
and
intentionally
permits
such
escape. So if a person willfully, deliberately and premeditately
plans to kill another, and lies in wait for him, and kills him, he is
guilty of murder, and loses his own life; but if a person unintentionally kills another by carelessness, he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and must only do penitence in servitude.
for two years, when he is released, a normal man, and a rehabilitated citizen.
The case at bar is one of those unforunate cases in which
the state has been greviously wronged through the carelessness
of a cean minded and well meaning person. It is a case of crime
by misadventure. Tompkins, a young man of 20 years, is indicted for involuntary manslaughter because he got X, aged 12,
into a boat in order to overcome his fear of water, and than
rocked the boat so that X fell out and was drowned.
Thus Tompkins has killed X, without an actual criminal intent but by great neglect and carelessness. I use the word killed. for anyone who willfully and deliberately does anything which
apparently endangers the life of another, and thereby occasions
the death of that other, is adjudged to kill him. Clearly Tompkins took long chances with the life of X, when he took him,
timid and afraid, out upon the water and then rocked the boat.
In an old case a man was held guilty of manslaughter, for having
carried his sick father from one town to another in cold weather,
so that he died from the exposure. Trickett, in his Pa. Cr. Law,
says, "The death may result from an act which in its chief elements and aims is legitimate, but which is done negligently, and
yet nbt so negligently that the carelesness may be deemed malice,
in which case the killing would be murder." And so in this case
Tompkins' act, in its chief elements and aims was legitimate, for
there is nothing evil about a desire to have a young lad lose
his fear of water, or about taking him out in a boat, in order
that he may grow accustomed to the water. But then to rock
the boat so -greatly and carelessly that the timid lad fell out,
that is surely gross negligence. And though. Tompkins made
earnest efforts to save X, the harm had already been done, and
that fact only goes to confirm us in our belief that he entertained
no malice, and to make us regret the more that his act had such
evil consequences, and that he was "so careless that he must be
found guilty as indicted.
Tompkins was only 20 years of age, but all persons over the
age of 14 years are presumed to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for crimes, unless the contrary is proved.
Thus In regard to liability for crime, Tompkins is in the same
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position as a person of full age. And the defense has not attempted to show that he lacked sufficient reasoning power to
realize that his acts did endanger the life of X.
Therefore our verdict is that Tompkins is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, in support of which we cite the following
cases: Thompson vs. State, 131 Ala. 18; People vs. Kilington,
36 Pa. 13; Com. vs. Morrison, 193 Pa. St. 613. And though he
,has greatly injured the peace and dignity of the commonwealth,
the law considers well his luckless position, and prescribes the
lenient punishment of two years' imprisonment, which sentence
we hereby impose.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Tompkins did an act which has not too remotely been fol..
lowed by the death of X to make him responsible for it. He intended that X should be thrust into the water, and compelled to
swim. X's being thus thrust into the water has eventuated in
his death. Tompkins can be properly said to have caused his
death. Had he intended the death, he would have been guilty of
murder in the first degree. He did not intend it, or any serious
harm, or, possibly, any harm at all. He thought it would be a
good thing for X to lose his water fright, and so thinking, his
act may be said to have been benevolent. But though the will
was kind, the result was deplorable. The act benevolent in
source proved to be maleficent in effect.
Tompkins had no right to undertake the correction of X's
fear, in the way employed, certainly without X's consent. His
act was not justifiable. It was also negligent. That a boy 12
years old and afraid of water, might, if suddenly plunged into
it, drown, should have been anticipated by Tompkins. It was at
least competent for a jury to so find, and to find that the failure to anticipate it was negligence, as -the anticipation of it
would have been malice.
The interesting discussion of the learned court below has
guided it to the proper decision. Of. Gribble vs. Texas, 210 S. W.
215, a similar case.
Judgment AFFIRMED.
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HICKS VS. POMEROY.
Trespass-Landlord and Tenant-Waiver of Notice to Quit-Act
March 31, 1905, P. L. 87-Holding Over After Notice-Duties
of Landlord After Notice-Injuries to Tenant Resulting from
Landlord's Non-feasance After Notice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
At the trial it appeared that Pomeroy owning an apartment let a suite of rooms to Hicks, who was to pay $50 a week
for every week of his occupancy and was to quit -the premises
on two days' notice. Ten weeks after taking possession, Hicks
was notified to quit in two days, the reason being that the rent
of three weeks remained unpaid and the rooms were being
abused. Hicks declared that he would not leave and Pomeroy
told him that the heat would be cut off in five days. Hicks remained during the five days, the heat was cut off. Hicks continued to hold possession, despite the extremely cold weather.
He and some children became sick. He then left, and isues
Pomeroy for the effect of cutting off the heat. The jury has
given him $300 damages. Motion for new trial.
Thompson for Plaintiff.
Heefner for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STONE, J.-The tenancy in this case is a tenancy from
week to week and by the Act of March 31, 1915, which provides
that in all tenancies for an indeterminate period or for a tenancy for less than a year, $0 days' notice must be given to
terminate said tenancy. Therefore the first question to be determnined is whether the two days' notice as agreed to in the
lease is a waiver of the statutory period.
The notice stipulated for was not intended as a condition
precedent to the termination of tenancy as possibly, it might
be construed if the tenancy were at will. It was manifestly intended to take the place of the statutory notice to remove. The
authorities holding that the tenant may waive the stautory
notice are sufficient to dispose of it. The thirty days' notice being
for the benefit of the tenant, he may waive it in his lease. Kaihu
vs. Leady, 1-5 C. C. R. 243; Wilgden vs. Whithead, 89 Pa. 131;
IvrKanna vs. Johnson, 19 Pa. 434; Hutchinson vs. Potter, 11 Pa.
472.
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Now it is true that the tenant was holding over wrongfully
and while the defendant, the landlord, had the right to have the
possession iofthat suite of rooms and to put the tenant out,
and to use so much force as was necessary short of committing
a breach of the peace, yet he had no right to wantonly injure
hm, even though the defendant may have supposed that- that
wanton injury might help him in getting plaintiff out; and since
he cut off the heat in cold weather as the facts state, then this
iswanton injury and he would be liabe for the direct consequences of that. The jury evidently believed the plaintiff and so
found a verdict in his favor. Hugg vs. Bridges, 29 Pa. Sup. 82.
.New trial refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPRIOR COURT.
The Act of March 31, 1905, P. L. 87, provides that, where
a lease is for an indeterminate time, possession may be obtained by the lessor, after a written notice demanding possession
within 30 days from the service thereof. The learned court below has decided that the right to this notice may be waived, and
that it was waived by the tenant agreeing to quit on two days'
notice. This we think correct. See the cases cited by him.
It follows that, after the two days had elapsed, the tenant
was no longer entitled to the possession, and that the landlord
had a right to it. How can he recover it? He is not compelled to
resort to an action of ejectment. "The landlord might," said the
court, "forcibly disposses him on the instant, by night or day,
and for motives of mere caprice with this limitation only, that
he should use no greater force than might be necessary, and do
ro wanton damage." Overdeer vs. Lewis, 1 W. & S. 90; Kellam
vs. Janson, 17 Pa. 467; Frick vs. Fiscus, 164 Pa. 623.
If breach of the peace could have been avoided, the landlord could have entered and set out all the furniture, the tables,
chairs, beds, stoves, were there such. This would be an inconvenience to the tenant, should he remain in the rooms but his
convenience is not to be promoted in the endeavor unlawfully to
detain the premises. The landlord might prefer applying the
force involved in ejection, to the furniture, to applying it to
the tenant's body with a large probability of a breach of the
peace.
Now what has the defendant done in this case? He has not
done as drastic an act as. entering the rooms and removing the
goods as he might have done. He has simply withheld a property, viz., heat, from the room, which the tenant had a right to
only so long as he had a right to the room, and this withhold-
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ing was effected without any violence or risk of violence. If
the landlord was not bound longer to allow the occupancy of the
rooms to th& tenant, how was he bound to allow heat to continue in order to make the protracted but unlawful occupancy of
the rooms agreeable?
The weather was extremely cold, and the plaintiff sullenly
remained, after the withdrawal of the heat, to the risk of sickness to himself and his children. After sickness followed, he
left. He now has the temerity to allege that he has suffered
damage from the act of the defendant. But has he? The landlord assumed, that just as a removal of his furniture would
probable secure the removal of the tenant so would removal of
the heat. The latter was as justifiable as would have been the
former. The injury to the tenant and his children was the result not of the withdrawal of the heat, but of the tenant's stubborn persistence in remaining without right, in the rooms. How is
he to fasten the injury from cold on the defendant?
The learned court below has apparently been swayed by
Huggins vs. Bridges, t29 Super. 82. The facts of that case are
not fully stated. Did the tenant know that the chimney was stopped up? Did he suffer from the gases before he was aware of
their being in the rooms? In the case before us, the landlord
has isimply ceased to spend his money in giving a comfortable
heat to a suite of rooms which the plaintiff had no right to occnpy. We are unable to derive from Huggins vs. Bridges the
doctrine that he could require the continuance of the supply of
heat so long as he improperly retained the rooms.
We regret to have to reverse a judgment supported by so
well written an opinion and which seems to be so well warranted
by the authority cited.

REVERSED.

MOTLEY vs. FIRE INSURANCE COLMPANY.
Assumpsit-Fire Insurance-Vacancy and Unoccupancy-Stipulation Against Storing Gasoline-Breach of ConditionWaiver-Suspension of Policy-Revival of Policy After
Breach of Condition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Defendant insured plaintiff's house for $5,000. The policy
stipulated that it should become void if gasoline were stored in
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the cellar, or if the house -should become vacant for 15 days.
Both of the conditions were violated; but for three months before the fire, this violation .had ceased. The company contends
that the policy was avoided, though the forbidden acts did not
contribute to the fire.
RWarfield for Plaintiff.
Werner for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
,STEVEINS, C. G., J.-This case involves in general the question
whether a contract of insurance is void absolutely upon a breach
of warranty contained therein, or merely suspended during the
continuance of the breach and again, revived to its full effect upon the discontinuance of the violation. Upon this general principle the decisions of the many states, Pennsylvania included,
are in conflict. But the more modern and equitable doctrines supported by the weiglht of -authority seem to be to the effect that a
breach of a provision, which, by the terms of the policy works a
forfeiture thereof, merely suspends the policy during the continuance of the violation; and upon its discontinuance, the policy
revives and the insurer is liable in spite of the fact that he could
have declared a forfeiture of the policy during the violation; and
that there was no consent on his part to the violation, provided,
however, that said violation in no way contributed to the subsequent fire. McClure, vs. Mutual Fire Insurance Company of
Chester County, 242 Pa. 59; Lancaster Silver Plate Company vs.
National Fire Insurance Company, 170 Pa. 151; Mears vs. Humbroldt Insurance Company, 92 Pa. 15; Bentley vs. Lumberman's
Insurance Company, 191 Pa. 276; Sumpter Tobacco Warehouse
Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company, S. C. 56, S. E. 654;
10 L. R. A. (N. .S) 736; Elliott an Inrsurance, Sec. 205.
The first violation in the present case was that 'of the condition that the policy should become void if gasoline were stored
in the cellar. The evidence shows that this violation had ceased
three months previous and that it had in no way contributed to
the fire. There is, however, no evidence for what purpose the
gasoline was stored or used.
In Krug vis. German Fire Insurance Company, 147 Pa. 272,
the court said that a single violation of the terms of the policy
for the necessary work incidental to the preservation of the
property insured would not be considered a breach of a condition.
In Lancaster Silver Plate Company vs. National Fire Insurance Company, 170 Pa. 151, it was held that it was proper for
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the lower court to refuse to charge, that if plaintiff used gasoline on his premises, the policy became void and there could be
no recovery.

In Bentley vs. Lumberman's Insurance Company, 191 Pa.
276, the court declared that the -occasional use of gasoline, even
if it did tend to increase the risk, was not an infringement
cf the policy, because that kind of use is permissable under a
-olicy prohibiting any use or -any keeping.
Lebanon County vs. Franklin Insurance Company, 237 Pa.
360, -holds that the use of a gasoline torch by a painter to burn
off the paint on a building will not void the policy.
In a recent case in this state, the doctrine of the construction to -be taken of warranties and the effect of their breach
seems to have been settled beyond a doubt. We refer to MoClure
vs. Insurance Company, 242 Pa. 59. It seems as though gasodine,
gunpowder and illuminating oil were kept on the premises in
considerable quantities, contrary to a provision in the policy
which stipulated that it should be void in case this were done.
This violation had been discontinued some two years previous to
the fire. Mr. Justice Elkin said: "The sounder and more equitable rule is against absolute forfeiture and in favor of the doctrine that the policy, -although suspended during the time the
prohibited articles are kept on the premises, may be revived by
a discontinuance of the keeping or use of such prohibited articles. * * * * * After full consideration we have concluded that

the policy in question here was not -absolutely forfeited by keeping the prohibited articles on the premises, even if they had not
been a part of the stock of merchandise in the store, but that the
policy at most was only suspended during the time the prohibited articles were so kept and was revived by the discontinuance of the prohibited uses * * * * * If anything in our cases

gives support to a different view, the decisions in those cases
must be modified to the extent herein indicated." From the firm
stand taken by this opinion it seems very evident that the court
intends to lay down a ruling to be applied to cases of this nature
in Pennsylvania henceforth, and to amalgamate the decisions
made heretofore.
Applying the decisions cited above, although some may not
be in point and have to do with the increase of hazard, yet they
are applicable in making up the general rule, we are of the opinion that the policy was suspended only during the period in which
the gasoline was stored in the cellar and revived by the discont.nuance of the use, and the fact that such storing contributed
in no way to the fire. The provision was intended to prohibit the
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habitual and constant use of gasoline, and not its temporary or
exceptional use. Mears v. Humboldt Fire Insurance Company,
92 Pa. 15. In accord see citations above. Mutual Fire Insurance
Company vs. Coatesville Shoe Factory, 80 Pa. 407; Fleck vs.
Insurance Company, 18 D. L. R. 171; MoKeesport Machine Company vs. Ben Franklin Insurance Company, 175 Pa. 53; Mutual
Fire Insurance Company, vs. Coatesville Shoe Factory, 80 Pa.
407; Troder's Insurance Company vs. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256; 2
Joyce on Law of Ins., 2nd ed., p. 3839.
The other condition of the policy stipulated that if the -house
should become vacant for 15 days, the policy became void. Like
the condition just considered, it also was violated. That is, the
house was vacant for more than 15 days. But, also like the facts
cf the former case, the vacancy had ceased three months before
the fire and had in no way contributed to it. Likewise, the
question to be dwelt upon, is whether such violation will void the
policy absolutely, or whether it is merely suspended during such
misuse and -again revived upon its discontindance and the company liable.
" * * * * * the better rule seems to be that, the effect of a

vacancy is merely to suspend the insurance during the existence
of the vacancy," 2 Cooley on Ins. 1680; Insurance Company of
North America vs. Garland, 108 Ill., 220; Ring vs. Phoenix Insurance Company, 145 Mass. 426; Laselle vs. Hoboken Fire Insurance Company., 43 N. J. Law 468.
"It appears to be the better rule that a vacancy merely suspends the policy, and if the premises are reoccupied before the
loss, liability under the policy again attaches." 6 Cooley on
Insurance, sup. p. 532; 14 R. C. L. sec. 283; President, etc., of
Insurance Company of North America vs. Pitts, 88 Miss. 587,
41 South 5.
"Under a provision that the policy shall be void in case the
premises shall be vacant or unoccupied, the contract is held to
be only suspended during the time the premises are vacant." 4
Joyce on Insurance 3839; Schuerman vs. Dwelling House Insurance Company, 57 Ill. App. 200.
In Pennsylvania we have been unable to find an authorative
case on point, bearing out what seemis to be the trend of the
modern courts and authorities, as shown by the above excerpts.
We are of the opinion, however, that the case of McClure vs.
Mutual Fire Insurance Company -of Chester, 242 Pa. 59, is indictative not only of the narrow class of prohibited articles, but
also of the general interpretations placed on insurance policies.
In fact this belief has been intimated in two very recent cases:
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Hall vs. Sugar Valley Fire Insurance Company, 64 Pa. Superior
Ct. 333, and Devaney vs. Northwestern National Insurance Company, 64 Pa. Superior Ct. 510. In the former case it was said:
"We are not unmindful of the attitude which is taken towards
insurance contracts by our courts, as expressed in McClure, etc.,
242 Pa. 59." The court then goes on to say that the doctrine cannot be applied where a permanent vacancy of the premises is intended. In the latter case, the court said, "An insurance policy
is to be construed most strongly against the company * * * * *
McClure, etc., 242 Pa. 59. In that case a doctrine, of substan.
tial compliance with the terms and conditions of the policy is
established, in which a breach of condition does not void the
policy but merely suspends it during the continuance of the
breach."
Further discussion of the case seems to us to be unwarranted. We are forced to declare the case of Hardiman vs. Fire
Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 383, relied upon by
the learned counsel for the defendant in his excellent brief,
overruled by the recent decisions of our courts. We do not deem
an interpretation of the terms "void" and voidable" necessary as
there is no contention as to their application. The fire insurance
policy of the plaintiff was suspended (luring the time in which
the warranties were violated, and could have been avoided at
that time by the defendant; but upon failure to do so, and an
abeyance of the infringement, the policy is recalled to life and
the company liable.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The policy defines the obligation of the insurance company.
It has chosen to be liable for a fire, with two exceptions; and its
obligations, with these limitations, has been accepted by the insured. The first excepton is, that the policy is to become void if
-gasoline should be stored in the cellar. We have here, no quest'on of the proper interpretation of this condition; no question
,whether certain fugitive acts were a "storing." The conditions
in the sense intended by the parties has been broken. "Both of
the conditions were violated," says the case stated. Then, why
is the stipulation not to have effect? The contract avoids itself
on the breach. The plaintiff has agreed, the defendant has insisted that it should. Why should we strike from the agreement,
this important qualification?
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The contract is not, as it might have been, that it should become void if gasoline were stored, etc., and if a fire occurred,
*.,hile, or because it was so stored. The parties have not said so.
What ground is alleged for a reformation of the contract?
It is supposed that the parties could not have intended that
a storage of gasoline for any time, should avoid the policy if it
did not contribute to the fire. In the face of the clear language
of the parties, this is a wholy gratuitous and baseless asumpton. Much easier to believe, is the proposition that they could
rot have failed to detect the difference between a negation of the
contract, if gasoline were stored in the cellar, and the negation
of it, if gasoline, so stored, should be the cause of the fire.
It is supposed that McClure vs. Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 242 Pa. 59, teaches a different doctrine. Hardly. The
keeping of the prohibited article had been discontinued for two
years before the fire, and premiums were paid and renewal re,
ceipts issued long after the discontinuance of the use. See page 64.
"Under these circumstances it is our conclusion," says Elkin,
J., "that the policy was not rendered absolutely void by what occurred, but was only suspended * * * * * and that it was revived

by the discontinuance of the prohibited use, and by the payment
of premiums and the issuance of renewal receipts after that time."
Here the violation had ceased three months before the fire, but
no act of the company that could be construed into a waiver of
the breach of the condition, appears. Referring to Fire Insurance
Company vs. Williamson, and three other cases (p. 64) Elkin,
J., concedes that they would have great weight but for the fact
that they held the policies to be forfeited, "because their terms
had been violated, but nothing was said," he emphasizes,
"about a revival of the policy by a discontinuance of the prohibited uses, and the payment of annual premiums thereafter."
The policy avoided itself, likewise if the house should become vacant 1.5 days. This condition was violated, but the violation had ceased for three months when the fire occurred. We are
unable to treat the stipulation otherwise than the one just considered. In Hardiman vs. Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 383, was a similar condition. The premises had been
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vacated, but before the fire, had been reoccupied. The Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant. "No recovery
could be had," says Potter, J., "for the plain condition of the
policy was broken, and the contract of insurance became void."
The trial court's refusal to affirm that "when the loss takes
place at a time when the risk is not increased, the object of the
condition falls, the condition falls with it" was approved. Potter,
J., cites Bemis vs. Insurance Company, 20 Pa. 340, where the
policy declared that it should be void if any change took place
in the interest, title, or possession of the insured, and when the
property was conveyed by-the insured, and in five months was
conveyed back to him, before the fire. Said Potter, J., "the relation of insurer and insured was terminated when the condition
was thus voluntarily broken by the act of the insured. It could
not be restored without the express or implied consent of the insurer." -Cf. Insurance -Company of London vs. The County of
Coos, 151 U. S. 452.
It is necessary then that judgment of the learned court below be
REVERSIDD.

